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Abstract: This paper reports laboratory experiments and simulations on a minority 
game. The minority game is the most important example for a classic non-zero-
sum-game. The game can be applied on different situations with social and 
economic contests. We chose an elementary traffic scenario, in which subjects had 
to choose between a road A and a road B. Nine subjects participated in each 
session. Subjects played 100 rounds and had to choose between one of the roads. 
The road which the minority of players chose got positive payoffs. We constructed 
an extended reinforcement model which fits the empirical data. 
 
Introduction and Experimental Set-Up 
The minority game is the most important example for a classic non-zero-sum-game and 
can be applied on different situations with social and economic contests. Imagine two 
big and famous gold fields in South Africa, near Cape Town and Johannesburg. The 
diggers heard that a big gold-nugget was found in Johannesburg. From now on every 
digger went to Johannesburg to dig gold, the city got overcrowded and there was not 
enough space for all of them, so the profit was very small. The diggers who stayed in 
Cape Town on the other hand had enough space for their claims. The profit in Cape 2 
Town was very high for everybody. This is an example of the minority game, the people 
who choose the majority got no payoffs, but the people on the minority in Cape Town 
found enough gold for all of them, so everybody got a payoff.  
 
The minority game which is also called the El Farol Bar Problem (EFPB), was 
introduced by Arthur [1]. The setup of the minority game is the following: a number of 
agents n have to choose in several periods whether to go in room A or B. Those agents 
who have chosen the less crowded room win, the others lose. Later on, the EFBP was 
put in a mathematical framework by Challet and Zhang [2], the so-called Minority 
Game (MG). An odd number n of players has to choose between two alternatives (e.g., 
yes or no, A or B, or simply 0 or 1). In the Literature are many examples, where the MG 
is discussed [2,3,4]. In this paper we transferred the minority problem into a route 
choice context. We did minority game experiments at the Laboratory of Experimental 
Economics (University of Bonn). In these Experiments subjects are told that in each of 
100 periods they have to make a choice between a road A and road B for travelling from 
X to Y.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Participants had to choose between a road [A] and a road [B]. 
 
The number of subjects in each session was 9. They were told the time tA and tB depends 
on the numbers nA and nB of participants choosing A and B, respectively: 
B A B A n n t t < ⇔ = = 0 , 1  
B A A B n n t t > ⇔ = = 0 , 1 . 
The period payoff was  A t  if A was chosen and  B t  if B was chosen. The total payoff of a 
subject was the sum of all 100 period payoffs converted to money payoffs in Euro [€] 
with a fixed exchange rate of 0.2 € for each experimental money unit (Taler). 3 
Additionally every participant received a show-up fee of 3 €. One session took roughly 
one hour. There are no pure equilibria in this game. The pareto-optimum can be reached 
by 4 players on one road and 5 players on the other road. Two treatments have been 
investigated. In treatment I the subjects received information about: whether own last 
choice was in the minority or majority, the last chosen route, the payoff of the last 
period in Taler, the cumulated payoff in Taler and thenumber of the actual period. In 
treatment II additional feedback was provided about distribution on both-routes in the 
last period. Six sessions were run with treatment I and six with treatment II. No further 
information was given to the subjects. 
Observed Behaviour 
Number of Players on the Road A 
Figure 2 shows the number of participants on the road A as a function of time for a 
typical session of treatment I. Fig. 3 shows the number of participants on the road A as a 
function of time for a typical session of treatment II. There are substantial fluctuations 
until the end of the session. The same is true for all sessions of both treatments. The 
mean number of players on the road A is 4.5 in treatment I and 4.43 in treatment II. This 
was expected, because of the experimental setup, there is no preference for one road. 
The fluctuations can be measured by the standard deviation of the number of 
participants choosing A per period. This standard deviation is between 0,67 and 1,5. In 
view of these numbers one can speak of substantial fluctuations in each of the 12 
sessions. The fluctuations are obvious larger under treatment I than under treatment II. 
The effect is significant. The null-hypothesis is rejected by a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-







































































Fig. 3. Number of participants on A [a typical session of treatment II]. 
 
The non existence of pure strategy equilibria poses a coordination problem which may 
be one of the reasons for non-convergence and the persistence of fluctuations. Feedback 
on both travel times vs. feedback on only own travel time has a beneficial effect by the 
reduction of fluctuations. This effect is remarkable.  5 
 
number of players on A    
mean std.  dev. 
session I 01  4,33 1,36 
session I 02  4,74 1,50 
session I 03  4,41 1,50 
session I 04  4,40 1,31 
session I 05  4,65 1,33 













treatment I  4,50  1,38 
session II 01  4,19 1,35 
session II 02  4,62 1,19 
session II 03  4,36 1,05 
session II 04  4,34 0,97 
session II 05  4,62 0,84 














treatment II  4,44  1,01 
Tab. 1. Mean and standard deviation of participants on A. 
Road Changes 
Figure 4 shows an example of the number of road changes as a function of time for a 
typical session of treatment I. There was a negative trend in each session of treatment II. 
By comparison in treatment I there were four sessions with a positive and two with a 
negative trend. The fluctuations are connected to the total number of road changes 
within one session. The median number of road changes is significantly higher in 
treatment I. The null-hypothesis is rejected by the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test on a 
level of 1% (one sided). The mean number of road changes under treatment I is also 
higher than under treatment II. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-


































Fig. 4. Number of road changes [a typical session of treatment I]. 
 
 
Under treatment I subjects who mainly choose only one of the roads feel the need to 
travel on the other road from time to time in order to get information on both roads. 
Under treatment II there is no necessity for such information gathering. This seems to 
be the reason for the greater number of changes and maybe also for the stronger 
fluctuations under treatment I.  
 
number of road changes
mean
session I 01 5,08
session I 02 3,87
session I 03 5,16
session I 04 5,19
session I 05 5,28
session I 06 4,35
treatment I 4,82
session II 01 3,99
session II 02 3,68
session II 03 3,67
session II 04 5,19
session II 05 4,67


























Tab. 2. Mean and standard deviation number of road changes. 
 7 
Payoffs and Road Changes 
In all sessions except one session of treatment I the number of road changes of a subject 
is negatively correlated with the subject’s payoff. Tab. 4 shows that the negative 
correlation between the payoff and number of road changes in treatment II is higher 
than in treatment I.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Scatter diagram cumulative payoff/number of road changes for treatment I and II. 
 
   Spearman rank correlation between 
cumulative payoffs and number of 
road changes 
session I 01  -0,48 
session I 02  0,34 
session I 03  -0,44 
session I 04  -0,70 
session I 05  -0,18 













treatment I   -0,27  
session II 01  -0,51 
session II 02  -0,54 
session II 03  -0,30 
session II 04  -0,82 
session II 05  -0,27 














 treatment II  -0,54  
Tab. 3. Spearman rank correlation between cumulative payoffs and number of road changes for 
treatment I and II. 8 
In every eleven observations of both treatments the Spearman rank correlations between 
cumulative payoffs and the number of road changes is negative. The Spearman-
correlation-coefficients in treatment II are lower than in treatment I. This effect is small 
but significant. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-hypothesis on a 
significance level of 10% (one sided). Even if subjects change roads in order to get 
higher payoffs, they do not succeed in doing this on the average. This suggests that it is 
difficult to use the information provided by the feedback to one’s advantage.  
Response Mode 
A participant who had no payoff on the road chosen may change his road in the next 
period in order to travel where it is less crowded. We call this the direct response mode. 
The direct response mode is the prevailing one but there is also a contrarian response 
mode. The contrarian participant expects that a positive payoff will attract many others 
and that therefore the road chosen will be crowded in the next period. For each subject 
let c- (c+) be the number of times in which a subject changes the roads when there was a 
payoff p=0 (p=1) in the period before. And for each subject let s- (s+) be the number of 
times in which a subject stays on the road when there was a payoff s=0 (s=1) in the 
period before. 
  change stay 
 p=0  − c   − s  
 p=1  + c   + s  
 
Tab. 4. 2x2 table for the computation of Yule coefficients. 
 
For each subject such a 2x2 table has been determined and a Yule coefficient Q has 
been computed as follows. 
 
− + + −




s c s c
s c s c
Q  
The Yule coefficient has a range from –1 to +1. In our case a high Yule coefficient 
reflects a tendency towards direct responses and a low one a tendeThe mean and the 
standard deviation of the Yule coefficients are shown in Tab. 6. The mean Yule 
coefficients are significantly higher in treatment II. The null-hypothesis for both 9 
treatments is rejected by a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test on the significance level of 
1% (one sided). That means there are less contrarian response modes in treatment II.  
 
Yule coefficiants Q    
mean std.  dev. 
session I 01  0,14 0,62 
session I 02  0,15 0,43 
session I 03  0,27 0,76 
session I 04  0,01 0,47 
session I 05  0,11 0,75 













treatment I  0,11  0,60 
session II 01  0,21 0,75 
session II 02  0,42 0,39 
session II 03  0,48 0,61 
session II 04  0,72 0,40 
session II 05  0,68 0,66 














treatment II  0,56  0,52 
Tab. 5. Mean and standard deviation of the Yule coefficients in both treatments. 
 
Simulations 
In order to get more insight into this theoretical significance of our result, we have run 
simulations based on a version of a well known reinforcement learning model, the 
payoff-sum model. This model already described by Harley (1981) [5] and later by 
Arthur (1991) [6] has been used extensively by Ereth and Roth [7,8] in the experimental 
economics literature. Here we used an extended payoff-sum model, which is already 
published in Selten et al. [9]. Table 7 explains the version underlying our simulations. 
We are looking at player i who has to choose among n strategies 1,…,n over a number 
proportional to its “propensity” 
t
j i x , . In period 1 these propensities are exogenously 
determined parameters. Whenever the strategy j is used in period t, the resulting payoff 
t
i a  is added to the propensity if this payoff is positive. If all payoffs are positive, then 
the propensity is the sum of all previous payoffs for this strategy plus its initial 
propensity. Therefore one can think of a propensity as a payoff sum. In our simulations 10 
we chose the same conditions as in the experiments. For 100 periods 9 players (agents) 
interact with each other. Each player has four strategies: 
 
1. road A:  This strategy simply consists in taking the decision for the road A. 
2. road B:  This strategy consists in taking the road B. 
3. direct:  This strategy corresponds to the direct response mode. The payoff of a 
player is 1, then the player stays on the road last chosen. If his payoff is 0 
the players changes the road. 
4. contrarian: This strategy corresponds to the contrarian response mode. The payoff of 
a player is 1, then the player changes the road. If his payoff is 0 the 
players will stay on the road. 
 
In the first period only strategy one and two were available to the simulated subjects 
since strategy three and four cannot be applied because there is no previous payoff. In 
the simulations we did not want to build in prejudices based on theoretical values. Our 
simulated players base their behaviour on initial propensities and observations only. Of 
course, it is assumed that as in the experiments the players get feedback about their own 
payoffs immediately after their choices. In the experimental treatment II additional 
feedback about the payoff on the route not chosen was given. The payoff sum model 
makes use of a player’s own payoff only and therefore ignores the additional feedback 
of treatment II. 
 
The differences between treatment I and treatment II cannot be explained by the payoff 
sum model since it does not process the additional feedback information given in 
treatment II. For the purposes of comparing our simulation data with the experimental 
data we ignore the differences between treatment I and II which are not big anyhow. 
The difficulty arises that the initial propensities must be estimated from the data. We did 
this by varying the initial propensities for the strategies road A and road B over all 
integer values from 1 to 10 and the initial propensities for the strategies direct and 
contrarian over all integer values from 0 to 10. 
 11 
We compared the simulation results with the six variables listed in Tab. 8. We aimed at 
simulation results which were between the minimum and maximum experimental 
results over all twelve sessions of treatment I and II. For each of the 12100 parameter 
combinations we have run 1000 simulations. 
 




1 , n i i x x  the initial propensity, where n is 
                        the number of strategies, which are used in the simulations. 











t+1. period:   For each player i, let 
t
i a  the payoff of player i in period t,  
 and j the number of the chosen strategy in period t.  
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Tab. 6. The extended payoff-sum model. 
 
There were three parameter combinations which satisfied the requirement of yielding 
means for the six variables between the minimal and maximal experimentally observed 
values. This was the parameter combination (1,1,2,1) and (2,2,1,1) and (3,3,4,2). The 
numbers refer to road A, road B, direct and contrarian in this order. The parameter 
combination is a reasonable vector of initial propensities. There is no difference 
between road A and road B, so it is reasonable to have the same propensities for both 
roads. In two of the three vectors the propensity of the direct mode is greater than the 
others propensities. There were especially in treatment II as you see on the yule 
coefficients more direct response modes. This could be an explanation for the direct 
propensities in the simulations. 
 12 
 
Tab. 7. Experiments and simulations with 9 players. 
 
It is surprising that a very simple reinforcement model reproduces the experimental data 
as well as shown by Tab. 8. Even the mean Yule coefficient is in the experimentally 
observed range. In spite of the fact that at the beginning of the simulation the behaviour 
of all simulated players is exactly the same. It is not assumed that there are different 
types of players.  
Conclusion 
Fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions in both treatments. Feedback on both 
road times significantly reduces fluctuations in treatment II compared to treatment I. 
This effect is strong. There is a significant rank correlation between the total number of 
road changes and the size of fluctuations. In treatment I road changes may serve the 
purpose of information gathering. This motivation has no basis in treatment II. 
However, road changes may also be attempt to improve payoffs. The finding of a 
negative correlation between a subject’s payoff and number of road changes suggests 
that on the average such attempts are not successful. Two response modes can be found 
in the data, a direct one in which road changes follow bad payoffs and a contrarian one 
in which road changes follow good payoffs. One can understand these response modes 
as due to different views of the causal structure of the situation. If one expects that the 
road which is crowded today is likely to be crowded tomorrow one will be in the direct 
response mode but if one thinks that many people will change to the other road because 
it was crowded today one has reason to be in the contrarian response mode. We have 
presented statistical evidence for the importance of the two response modes. We have 
also run simulations based on a simple payoff sum reinforcement model. Simulated 
mean values of six variables have been compared with the experimentally observed 13 
minimal and maximal of these variables. The simulated means were always in this 
range. Only four parameters of the simulation model, the initial propensities, were 
estimated from the data. In view of the simplicity of the model it is surprising that one 
obtains a quite close fit to the experimental data. The response modes direct and 
contrarian also appear in the simulations as the result of an endogenous learning 
behaviour by which initially homogeneous subjects become differentiated over time.  
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